The United States established diplomatic relations with Panama in 1903 after its separation from Colombia. To celebrate this official recognition, NARA's National Declassification Center (NDC) focused on the recently declassified records in our custody that pay homage to what the American Society of Civil Engineers has called the world's seventh civil engineering wonder, the Panama Canal. Most Americans may have heard of the Panama Canal, but few may know the role of the United States in its construction and maintenance, much less the role it played in our foreign relations with Panama. The debate continues to revolve around the reasons why the United States, U.S.
UU. He handed over the Canal to Panama, Panamanians distrust the United States Government in general and the imperialist image associated with the American employees who managed and lived in the Canal Zone. Many historians have examined our early relations with Panama before and after construction, but not many have analyzed the period immediately preceding the renovation of the Canal. The records that have recently been declassified focus on the era before billing and can help U.S.
citizens and academics understand the story that led to one of the biggest changes in U.S. foreign policy since the Canal was built. The series of classified records related to Panama were identified, surveyed and selected to be declassified from Registration Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, and from Registration Group 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. The records were reviewed and declassified. From the declassified documents, a selection of documents from these groups of records was selected to illustrate the type of information that can be found in our inventory.
The declassified records consist of memorandums, correspondence, telegrams, reports, and scattered photographs on issues such as the Ford United States, domestic political affairs, economic issues, the defense of the Canal, and United States Military presence, discussion about a new channel at sea level and Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal and the Canal Zone. The records provide a significant view of the Canal's transition from U.S. control to Panamanian jurisdiction, just as older, unclassified records provide information about the early history of the Canal. The political motivations, economic problems and nationalist fervor that caused tension between the United States and the United StatesAnd Panama is widely spoken of in these recently declassified records.
The images selected for this web page represent just a few of the recently declassified records found in NARA stock that focus on the U.S. When more related records are identified and declassified, they will be added to this web page. To locate the relevant records that are in the custody of NARA, the investigator must be familiar with the missions of the various United States. Government agencies and how they intersect with your topic.
The researcher can use this strategy to narrow down their topic before arriving at NARA. The online National Archives Catalog is available to help researchers locate specific records related to their topic. Placing several keywords in the catalog search box along with the Panama Canal has proven to be useful when searching the catalog. For example, entries such as “The Panama Canal and Naval Operations” or “Relations between Panama and the United States” resulted in “related visits” in the National Archives Catalogue. The need to continue negotiations was due to what Panamanians considered inappropriate interpretations on the part of the United States.
These misinterpretations revolved around issues such as the issue of sovereignty, the “in perpetuity” clause, the flying of the Panamanian flag in the Zone, the importation of third-party goods into the Zone, the exclusion of Panamanian goods and services from the Zone's markets, and discrimination against Panamanians working in the Zone. On the other hand, they considered that Panamanians saw the Canal as “their food ticket” and exploited it accordingly. Most Panamanians were convinced that the United States was not treating them fairly and were very frustrated by the fact that Panama had failed to make adjustments to the structure of the Canal Treaty that would favor Panama's interests. Panama was profoundly opposed to the exercise of sovereign powers by the United States in the Canal Zone and considered that the situation was an affront to its national dignity. The following documents illustrate the Panamanian reaction faced with this situation.
Consult in the Catalogue of National Archives the memorandums on the proposed Treaty between Panama and the United States of 1926 that Panama never ratified, dated July 1963. If the United States wanted to improve its relations with Panama, they had to recognize that there were real misunderstandings in relation to the treaties, that these misunderstandings needed to be addressed and that the basic rights of the United States related to the Zone needed to be modified in some way for the benefit of Panama. The recently declassified records focus on issues such as whether or not the United States needed to make concessions, what type of concessions, to what extent Panama should participate in the operation of the Canal, and Panama's economic link with the Canal Zone. This constant coming and going over what the treaties allowed or didn't allow created tension between countries. What follows is a sample of the various documents that focus on this topic. Memorandum on recent developments in relations between the United States and Panama, November 27, 1959 Memorandum on relations between the United States and Panama, September 29, 1959, memorandum from the Department of State, entitled Panamanian Accusations against the United States in connection with the Panama Canal, dated January 21, 1972 Information document on recent events in Panama, December.
Citizens who worked in the Zone, known as “Zonians”, were considered to have colonial attitudes when dealing with Panamanians. The troops and military installations were seen as an “affront” by local Panamanians to their sovereignty. Whether or not Panama was treated as a territory or a colony profoundly influenced U.S. relations with Panama and affected social and economic interactions between countries. The following documents highlight this situation. Newspaper clipping about Panama to not recognize any privileged group or special class, July 17, 1971 Letter to Jack B.
Parker regarding the slowdown of the pilot program, June 21, 1973, memorandum about the White House meeting, March 18, 1960, memorandum about the course of action to prevent new demonstrations, February Concessions were always a point of negotiation that both parties used as leverage against each other, as shown in the following documents. Letter to the Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Galileo Solís, Memorandum of September 9, 1963 on Panama's complaints, July 8, 1965 Report on Panama, August 19, 1965, Position Paper, October 29, 1965 Canal issues and treaty negotiations dominated Panama's domestic politics and relations with the United StatesBoth sides saw the channel dispute as an explosive issue that could disrupt upcoming Treaty negotiations. The treaty negotiations in 1964 became a campaign issue in the Panamanian elections. Various Panamanian political groups used the names of the United States, the United States and the Canal to remind voters that they have been treated as a territory or a colony and not as a sovereign partner, as promised in the treaty of 1903. Each group stated that, if elected, under their regime, the treaty negotiations would finally guarantee the rights of Panamanians as a sovereign nation and would increase the country's share of the economic benefits of having the Canal on the isthmus.
Both newspaper articles and radio commercials appeared for or against various political opinions in the United States. Panamanian national opinion on the need for a change in the relationship between the United States and the Panama Canal was so fierce that no Panamanian government, regardless of its political composition, could avoid taking a strongly nationalist stance on the issue of treaties. I was under pressure to be seen as negotiating. in good faith.
To consider otherwise could be used as campaign rhetoric to provoke the population to take to the streets to protest to show their dissatisfaction with the current situation of the treaties and the United States. The main candidates in these elections were Marco Robles and Arnulfo Arias, and both used their campaigns to remind the United States that favorable treaty conditions and economic concessions would calm the Panamanian electorate and guarantee the possibility of a successful treaty negotiation. So, once the vote was completed and the ballots were counted, Robles was chosen by a narrow margin. Arias complained that the election was fraudulent, but the charges were never proven. The presence of these political tensions is analyzed in the following documents.
In the months following the elections, Arias and his Panamenist Party continued to oppose the Robles government. However, Arias and other opposition groups, including communists, were unable to pose a serious threat to the Robles government to overthrow them from power for some elections. However, the Robles government was not in a strong position either, since it only had a very small majority in the National Assembly. Arias and his party used the National Assembly as a platform to criticize the Robles government for issues such as rising unemployment, fiscal difficulties, alleged corruption and its management of the Canal negotiations.
The political actors and their agendas are mentioned in the following documents, among which the persistence of internal political tensions in Panama stands out. Weekly Review Report, Position Paper of September 30, 1965 on Panama, Communism, and Communist Subversion, Letter of March 1, 1965 to Jack Vaughn by Edward W. Clark, August 26, 1964 It wasn't until 1967 that three draft treaties were released to the Panamanian population. The three draft treaties referred to a new treaty on the Panama Canal, an agreement on basic rights and the status of forces, and a treaty for the construction of a new sea-level canal in Panama.
The draft treaty reflected Panama's desire to have sovereignty over the Zone, but it had not deleted the section on the continued presence of U.S. military bases in the Zone and of States United Right to deploy troops and weapons anywhere in the republic. The inclusion of a text that allowed the presence of military bases in the Zone made the treaty unacceptable to Panamanians. Arias supporters and communists pointed to this as a failure on the part of Robles to fulfill the aspirations of the Panamanian people.
The National Assembly did not ratify the draft treaties. The following documents focus on political developments in Panama. Memorandum on the review of events in Panama for the meeting of the Panama Canal Company, April 9, 1965 Memorandum for the archives on relations between the United States and Panama, February 12, 1965 Memorandum of conversation on current Panamanian politics. Once again, this provided what many observers considered to be an opportunity for some Panamanian politicians to use the Canal issue to distract voters from the real social and economic problems that afflicted the nation during the election campaign.
Robles would not run for office again, but he supported the candidacy of David Samudio as president. Therefore, Samudio was seen as a political ally of Robes and a political objective for former critics of the Robles government. Political groups, such as communists and ultranationalists, used the unpopular terms previously negotiated by the Robles administration, as well as the continuous and slow negotiations against David Samudio, on the grounds that he would do more of the same. The Panamanian electorate expected to make headway at this juncture and any movement in the opposite direction was not welcomed.
Memorandum on the launch of a bitter anti-American campaign by the pro-Saudi media, document on the current political situation in Panama, October 10, 1968 Telegram on the supply of tear gas to the National Guard, March 23, 1968 Telegram on the reaction of the US Press Corp to the situation in Panama, January 10, 1964, Airgram on the request of the Junta to remove Arias from the area, November 14, 1968 Memorandum of 1968 for the archives on Arias' political activities in the Canal Zone, Oct. Officials contemplated several policy changes that would create a more acceptable treaty for Panama, such as the reduction of defense forces or the appointment of a civilian governor. In addition, between the negotiations, the plan to build a canal at sea level was eliminated. In 1965, it was thought that a new channel would soon be needed due to the increase in the size of commercial vessels, but the United States did not know where to build such a canal and, in the early 70s, the United States. I wasn't sure there needed to be one.
Therefore, the package of three treaties was no longer realistic. Once the issues of “sovereignty” and “perpetuity” were resolved, attention would return to the part of the negotiations of the treaty that referred to military bases. These new considerations are discussed in the following documents:. Memorandum to Kubisch on relations between the United States and Panama, June 6, 1973, Memorandum for the registration of treaty negotiations, November 11, 1972, Draft memorandum relating to the management of a short-term threat in Panama, Draft 1973 memorandum on the management of the problems of Panama, document of 1973 on the objectives of the United States in Panama, October 15, 1973 During these years of negotiations, Panamanians were not the only group interested in the negotiations of the treaty.
Labor organizations were also putting pressure on negotiations to obtain more favorable conditions for the United States. American canal workers asked the U.S. government to protect them from losing what many outsiders considered their “comfortable jobs and work benefits,” which included things like paid health insurance, a 25% tropical differential, generous vacation time, tax-free shopping, and low-subsidised rents and utilities. It didn't help that the Canal Zone public relations operation sent mixed signals to its workers. Praising the virtues of Canal operations, he encouraged residents of the Zone to resist change and to appreciate the status quo instead of accepting the change that Canal officials were leaning towards.
Document on the rights that the United States wants in a new treaty, June 6, 1970, Washington Post newspaper clipping on the return of the Canal, June 18, 1974 The United States House of Representatives was influenced by an active lobby of the United States Citizen Canal Zone employees, many of whom were second- and third-generation residents of the Zone and who fought against any erosion of their “rights”. The Senate tended to side with carriers who wanted low tolls. State Department officials faced the dubious task of keeping Panamanians happy and, at the same time, keeping Congress quiet. The following documents are examples of what many critics of EE.
The policy towards Panama was seen as the bitter inflexibility that afflicted Zonians, the general public of the United States and Congress. The following documents focus on the call to maintain the Canal's status quo and the rejection of Panamanian opinions. Mundt, by Ambassador Robert Sayre, September 1, 1971 Note on labor and labor aspects of treaty negotiations, September 20, 1971 Note for the record of congressional opinions and other opinions, March 13, 1973 In the 1960s, military activities in the Zone were under the direction of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Its main mission was to defend the Canal.
In addition, SOUTHCOM served as the nerve center for a wide range of military activities in Latin America, including communications, the training of Latin American military personnel, the oversight of U.S. military assistance advisory groups and the conduct of joint military exercises with Latin American armed forces, as well as the management of a jungle operations training center and an Inter-American Air Force Academy. However, the activities of the Command were not well received. A pending issue related to the treaties was the presence and functioning of the United States military forces, which constituted a significant presence on the isthmus.
The military was a potential consumer of goods, as well as an employer of a civilian workforce, of which 70 percent were Panamanian citizens. However, Panamanians continued to question the need for US military bases. For many, military bases were more linked to the control and repression of the civilian population than to the defense of the Canal. They supported the continued presence of the army in the isthmus, not only as a defensive position, but also presented their presence as an economic advantage for the Panamanian economy.
Panamanians pointed out that they were able to provide the defense of the Canal on their own and that much of the military activities were questionable and inappropriate under the original treaty agreements (as amended), such as conducting military training exercises, jungle warfare and environmental testing. Military officials wanted to include in the treaty a wording that would safeguard their right to defend the Canal unilaterally and to carry out specific military activities, such as the creation of military schools and military training. Panamanians vehemently opposed U.S. forces in the isthmus for several reasons, one of which was military support for the National Guard Panamanian.
The military trained most of the officers and non-commissioned officers (non-commissioned officers) of the Guard at the School of the Americas in the most modern ways to control rebel crowds. The Guard was also equipped with weapons and supplies from American soldiers in a tank, January 9, 1964. Many Panamanians saw the rule of the Panamanian oligarchy before 1968 as an obstacle to allowing more citizens to overcome the level of poverty. The oligarchy's use of the Guard during the riots of 1964 did not make their citizens appreciate them. The military support of the Panamanian Government's police force (the National Guard) made them protectors of the status quo. Therefore, any action by the National Guard during demonstrations or other forms of protest would not bring joy to most Panamanians, and the U.S.
military was not well received in the isthmus because of what many locals considered the large number of bases and facilities. This reinforced the idea that Panama was a territory of the United States. The following documents highlight the position of the military in favor of keeping American bases on the isthmus and the opposition they encountered. Letter from Robert Sayre to Harry Shlaudeman, memorandum dated August 2, 1973, asking the United States to pay the salaries of additional members of the National Guard, January National Archives and Records Administration: 1-86-NARA-NARA or 1-866-272-6272.
